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Abstract 
We study the wage outcomes of university graduates by course (i.e. by subject and 
institution) using the UK Labour Force Surveys (LFS). We that the selectivity of 
undergraduate degree programmes plays an important role in explaining the variation 
in the relative graduate wages. In fact, we find that much of the variation in relative 
wages across courses is due to the quality of students selected. Once we allow for 
course selectivity in our analysis we find that our estimates of the effects of attending 
the most prestigious HEIs is around 10 percentage points lower than otherwise; the 
effects of attending the middle ranking HEIs is around 5 percentage points lower; and 
that of attending these lowest ranking HEIs is unaffected. We go on to consider 
selection (on observables) into subjects and institutions using the Inverse Probability 
Weighted Regression Adjusted (IPWRA) method to estimate multiple treatment 
effects.  
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Graphical abstract 
University selectivity and the estimated relative value added by universities 
 
Dark grey is New universities; black hollow is Old universities; and light grey is the Russell Group of elite 
universities. The size of the bubble indicates institution size. Fitted line: slope=0.107 (robust se=0.013, 
R2=0.394) shows the effect of institutional selectivity on wages – 1 SD change in selectivity raises wages by 
11%. Omitted HEI is Manchester Metropolitan University. 
 
Highlights 
 Variation in graduate wages across institutions largely due to student 
selectivity  
 Explores an inverse probability weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA) 
method  
 OLS wage equation results hold when allow for selection on observables using 
IPWRA  
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1.  Introduction 
Higher Education (HE) selectivity, often called college selectivity in the US, refers to 
the quality of the students that attend each Higher Education Institution (HEI). HE selectivity 
is typically measured by the average ability of students on a course, as measured by their mean 
Standard Aptitude Test (SAT) score in the US, or “A(dvanced)-level” score in the UK. The 
strong correlation between HE selectivity and the labour market success of college graduates 
is firmly established in the literature (e.g. Dale and Krueger, 2002, 2014) – those students who 
attended more highly rated institutions, earn higher wages on average. Dale and Krueger (2002 
and 2014) go on to examine the impact of self-selection on this correlation by controlling for 
the average SATs score of the colleges that students applied to. While they are cautious about 
the validity of this, their data shows convincingly that the correlation becomes weaker and 
statistically insignificant.  
There are very few UK studies that focus on this important topic, mostly due to data 
limitations. This is disappointing since the UK is a good laboratory for addressing this topic 
because of the relatively homogeneous nature of the HE landscape, the low levels of non-
completion and delayed completion, and the much more specialized nature of UK bachelor 
degrees where students apply for a specific major which they specialize in for the, typically, 
three-year duration of the course. Heterogeneity is largely confined to the (strong) differences 
in the degree of selectivity across courses. The contribution of this paper, which builds on 
previous Labour Force Survey (LFS) analysis by Walker and Zhu (2013), is to examine the 
labour market earnings of graduates in the UK using the LFS (broadly equivalent to the US 
CPS data) by both major and by type of HEI. Recent LFS data provides information on both 
major and HEI and can be matched to course “selectivity”, as measured by the mean 
standardised scores at the institution-subject-cohort level in A-level national examinations at 
the end of High School using data provided by the Higher Education Statistics Agency 
(HESA).  
This allows us to correct for the quality of the intake of students by course. We are able 
to obtain well determined estimates even when we disaggregate to as many as 16 subject 
groups.1 Unlike earlier UK studies, we are able to consider the effect of differences across 
                                                          
1 Economics in the same group as the rest of Social Studies and we are not able to separate them out. The results 
in our previous work where it was possible to distinguish between Economics and the rest of Social Studies) 
suggest that the annual average earnings of Economics graduates is substantially higher than the rest of the group. 
Britton et al (2016) show similar results using an alternative dataset. We omit nursing because there are very few 
males and because a bachelor degree has only been a requirement for the last two decades. 
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undergraduate (UG) bachelor degree subjects and institutions. To the best of knowledge, we 
are the first UK study combining a nationally representative survey dataset (LFS) that records 
both HEI attended and the subject, together with mean A-level scores by UG course and entry 
year.  
Our new OLS results, that control for institutional selectivity, strongly suggest that the 
elite “Russell Group” (RG) institutions have substantially lower value-added once one controls 
for their selectivity (relative to Manchester Metropolitan University, MMU) which is the 
largest of the “New” universities  - institutions that were created from the former Polytechnics 
from 1993 onwards. The difference in value added for Old universities (relative to MMU) is 
somewhat smaller; and the difference for all New institutions (relative to MMU) is very close 
to zero. It appears that the raw data exaggerates the differences in the financial returns to 
attending more selective institutions.  
A further contribution of the paper is to allow for the effect of selection (on observables) 
into institutions and subjects. Since the problem then becomes one of evaluating multiple 
treatments (of type of subject studied and the type of HEI attended) we adopt an Inverse 
Probability Weighted Regression Adjusted (IPWRA) methodology. To implement this in our 
comparatively small sample we need to aggregate institutions into three broad, but natural, 
groups and we aggregate subjects into three groups. We find that OLS underestimates the 
effects of attending the most prestigious HEIs relative to the middle ranking HEIs, and of 
attending these relative to the lowest ranking HEIs, even when we include course selectivity, 
That is, the causal effect of institution type is biased downward in the OLS analysis. In addition, 
we provide the IPWRA estimates of the effects of subjects studied which reveals large effects 
of studying STEM subjects, smaller effects of Social Science, and no effect of studying Arts 
and Humanities courses. These estimates are somewhat larger than OLS estimates of the effects 
of subject. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
literature. Section 3 presents the institutional background while Section 4 introduces the data. 
Section 5 provides an explanation of the empirical methodology and its connection to OLS. 
Section 6 presents the OLS results and checks the robustness, while Section 7 explores the 
causal effect of broad HEI type and broad subjects of study using our IPWRA approach. 
Finally, Section 8 concludes. 
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2.   Literature Review 
The literature on college selectivity can be classified into two strands. The first is 
concerned with the relationship between college selectivity and students’ college choice and 
performance; while the second is concerned with the estimation of returns to college selectivity. 
Davies and Guppy (1997), using the US NLSY data, find that socio-economic status (SES) 
predicts entry into selective colleges, but not subject studied directly - except for the most 
lucrative majors within selective colleges. Moreover, men were more likely to enter fields of 
study with higher economic returns than women. Hoxby (2009) reviews the trend in college 
selectivity in the US over the past four decades: she finds that US colleges are not getting more 
selective, except at the very top end; and changes in selectivity are mostly due to the falling 
costs of distance and information. Descriptive analysis by Chetty et al (2017) of US college 
students since 1999 suggest that, while students from high income backgrounds are much more 
likely to attend highly selective colleges, the earnings of low and high-income background 
students are similar, conditional on college attended. Smith (2013), using a large twins dataset 
with application and enrolment information from the US, finds that a student’s probability of 
degree completion within four years increases by choosing a more selective institution - an 
increase of 5 percentage points from choosing an institution with a median SAT score 100 
points higher than the alternative. However, one should be cautious in interpreting the twins 
fixed-effect estimates as causal because these twins, not all identical, are unlikely to be as good 
as randomly assigned to different institutions. Indeed, Goodman et al. (2015) find that college 
choice is affected by older sibling college choice. Nonetheless, Smith (2013) found that 
methodology made little difference to the results. 
While earlier studies on returns to college selectivity are by and large descriptive in 
nature, the more recent literature pays closer attention to data quality and methodological issues 
in order to minimize bias in the estimates. Loury and Garman (1995) present a model where 
human capital depends on both performance at college (e.g. GPA) and college selectivity. 
Using the National Longitudinal Study (NLS) of the High School Class of 1972, they show 
that omitting college performance overstates the effect of college selectivity for Whites and 
understates it for Blacks. However, Black students with below median SAT scores of the 
college they attend have lower probability of graduation.  
Causal estimation of the effect of college selectivity on earnings may also be biased by 
selection on unobservables, to the extent that more selective HEIs assess applicants on 
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characteristics that are related to future earnings but would, in general, be unobservable to the 
econometrician. In order to moderate this bias, Dale and Krueger (2002) match students who 
applied, and were accepted by, with those rejected by the same set of colleges. Using the 
College and Beyond data set and the National Longitudinal Study (NLS) of the High School 
Class of 1972, they find little evidence of returns to attending more prestigious colleges for 
students with the same ability. Similarly, after partially adjusting for unobserved student ability 
by controlling for the average SAT score of the colleges that students applied to, Dale and 
Krueger (2014) conclude that estimates of the effects of college characteristics fall substantially 
and are generally indistinguishable from zero, except for students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds.2 
It is usual to group UK HEIs into three main types in descending order of selectivity — 
the Russell Group (RG), which is the self-selected “elite” research intensive universities that 
include Oxford and Cambridge; “Old” universities founded pre-1992  but outside the RG; and 
the post-1992 “New” universities which were formerly polytechnics prior to the end of the 
“binary divide” that existed between universities and polytechnics.3 There are very few studies 
on HE selectivity in the UK. Chevalier and Conlon (2003) is the first UK study on the subject. 
Using exit surveys of three UK graduate cohorts, known as the Destinations of Leavers from 
Higher Education (DLHE), they find that attending “Elite” (RG) universities leads to a 6% 
wage premium, compared to “New” universities; and no significant differences between “Old” 
and “New”. But wages were observed soon after graduation when wages are typically very 
noisy and little other information will be available to the employer, and their Propensity Score 
Matching estimates are imprecise because of thin common support. Hussain et al. (2009) use 
four graduate cohort studies and five different measures of HEI quality including the total tariff 
score4 at admission. They also find a positive return to attending a higher quality institution, of 
about 6% earnings difference for one standard deviation increase in the composite HEI quality 
index that they construct. Again, this study uses only recent graduates where employers may 
depend heavily on the quality signal associated with HEI reputation.  
                                                          
2 Brewer et al. (1999) find significant returns to elite private HEIs in the US even after accounting for selection. 
Chen et al. (2012) also find substantial returns to MBA selectivity using the Dale and Krueger method. 
3 We use RG, Old and New as short-hand hereafter. 
4 We use the variable that HESA labels “Total Tariff (average pre-university test score – A-level or equivalent)”. 
This is missing for a large minority of cells because there is a variety of alternative qualifications that are regarded 
as equivalent to a specific A-level score. This is unimportant provided the A-level score still provides a measure 
of the overall degree of selectivity of a course.  
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Finally, Broecke (2012) uses data that is collected from UK graduates three years after 
graduation who respond to the follow-up of the DLHE exit survey, for just the 2004/5 cohort 
of graduates. The response rate is low, and there is clear non-random non-response, and the 
earnings is still confined to a relatively early part of a graduate’s career. It compares the 
earnings of graduates who satisfied the entry conditions for their preferred institution, with 
applicants that failed to satisfy the entry conditions at the same institution but went to their 
second-choice institution instead. This is effectively a difference in differences design. The 
analysis controls for subject of study, and for the overall A-level score achieved, and the 
parameter of interest is the coefficient on the institutional selectivity measure (the average tariff 
score requirement for admission). While the author is cautious in interpreting the results, it 
seems that the part that signalling plays in the estimates is likely to be quite large at this 
relatively early point in a graduate career, compared to later on when we might expect the value 
added to productivity by the course attended to have a greater weight. 
Most recently, Britton et al. (2016) have examined the annual earnings of English 
domiciled graduates up to 10 years after graduation, allowing for HE selectivity using the 
HESA data in the same way as used here. Their data comes from the Her Majesty’s Revenue 
& Customs (HMRC, the UK tax authority) merged with Student Loan Company (SLC) data 
on graduates. SLC debt repayments in the UK are linked to earnings and are administered by 
HMRC through the Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) system. They find substantial annual earnings 
premia for Medicine, Economics, Law, Maths and Business relative to the excluded category 
– which broadly reflects our results. Moreover, they find large differences associated with a 
(relatively crude) measure of family background on median graduate earnings– a raw gap of 
25% in favour of students from higher income families: but this fails to be statistically 
significant (at the 5% level) in their analysis which accounted for HEI and subject.5  
Their study differs from ours in four important ways. First, their outcome variable is 
tax year earnings, while we focus on hourly wages - which is likely to be a better measure of 
productivity. Secondly, the LFS interviews all cohorts each year (although we can only include 
those for which HESA data is available which limits our data to entry cohorts from 19926 so 
                                                          
5 The Walker and Zhu (2013) analysis cannot distinguish between HEI types due to pre-2011 data limitations. 
6 In fact, we restrict the data to entry cohorts from 1992/93 because this is when the “binary divide” (between 
universities and “polytechnics”) was abandoned. Moreover, HESA data only became available for entry cohorts 
from 2000/01. However, we believe that relative admission “tariffs” changed little over time and we use STATA’s 
extensive missingness capabilities to allow us to retain data back to the end of the binary divide. 
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even our own sample contains few observations with more than 20 years of post-graduation 
work experience). In contrast, their HMRC data is restricted to individuals who are in the 
student loan system from 1998 and so will have no more than 10 years of work experience.  
Thirdly, our sample only covers graduates working as employees, whereas their data includes 
only those who choose to take out a loan.7 Finally, the HMRC data is the universe of students 
and is much larger than our survey-based data, and this will adversely affect the precision of 
our estimates, relative to theirs. 
3.  Institutional Background  
Higher education in the UK is almost universally provided by publicly funded 
universities, that are independent not-for-profit institutions and there is little direct control that 
the government exercises over any institution. Indeed, public subsidies have fallen dramatically 
in recent years with the introduction of large tuition fees supported by a sophisticated student 
loan scheme.8  Over the past half century, the UK HE sector has experienced several rounds of 
expansion, the most recent of which took place in the early 1990s. The 1992 Higher Education 
Act granted university status and degree awarding power to all higher education institutions, 
including former polytechnics – who responded by changing their names to replace the title 
polytechnic, with university.  Most universities offer a wide range of majors. UG majors in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland are typically of three years’ duration. Professional 
vocational subjects are offered as UG majors in the UK – for example Law, Architecture, 
Medicine and Dentistry are all subjects that can be studied at UG level although, amongst these, 
only Law is available as a three-year degree. Many of the less selective institutions do not offer 
these professional majors, although they do tend to offer a wider range of more vocational 
subjects that do not feed into the traditional “professions” such as Accountancy. Universities 
will have pre-requisites for entry into many majors - for example, Science A-levels are required 
for entry to Medicine; Maths is required for Science, Technology, Engineering, and Maths 
(STEM), as well as for most Economics majors; while A-levels in one or more modern 
languages is a requirement for most modern language majors. Students in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland typically study just four, or even three, A-Level subjects during the two years 
                                                          
7 While many law, accounting, and medical graduates become self-employed this is not typical early in the 
lifecycle and we find only 12% of the working graduates in our cohorts are self-employed. We know little about 
selection into loans, but the means-tested nature of the repayments mechanism suggests that those with higher 
rates of return will be less likely to participate in the programme because they would enjoy lower subsidies. 
8 See Walker and Zhu (2013) for the details of the history of UK student financial arrangements. 
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of post-compulsory schooling in senior high school.9 The narrow nature of the high school 
curriculum and the use of pre-requisites for many subjects imply that students effectively 
constrain their university major by the high school subject choices at the age of 16.  
There is a single portal that is used to apply to all HEIs and the same application 
information is circulated anonymously to all HEIs that a student applies to. Typically, students 
will apply for a range of HEIs at age 18 that offer the, sometimes narrow, range of major(s) 
that might be open to them. The range of HEIs that a student applies to will be driven, in part, 
by their expectations of their likely level of achievement at the end of high school. Most 
applicants apply to the same subject for all of the five HEIs that they are allowed to choose. 
Applicants are well aware of the likely grade requirements for admission since this is posted 
by institutions. They also have a good idea of their likely grades at the end of their A-level 
studies from predicted scores provided by their schools, so they tend to apply for several 
institutions that match their likely grades, and often to several slightly less selective 
institutions.  University applicants are already heavily selected since the senior high school 
participation rate is still well below 100%. The HE participation rate is approaching 50% of 
the overall cohort size. Students apply ahead of their high school graduation examinations on 
the basis of grades predicted by teachers and are made offers of admission that are conditional 
on grades achieved. They are allowed to provisionally accept two such offers; one of which is 
nominated as the insurance offer - against missing the conditions of the most preferred offer. 
Those who satisfy their conditional offer are admitted to their most preferred HEI, and students 
who do not are passed to their insurance HEI. Students who fail to meet either conditional 
offers can apply through a “clearing” mechanism that matches such students to remaining 
vacant places in that entry year.10  
The UK is small and yet students typically apply to HEIs that are some distance from 
the parental home – there is a tradition of college being a rite of passage associated with leaving 
home. Institutions usually provide accommodation in halls of residence (dorms) to ease the 
transition from home. Most institutions provide a full range of subjects, although there are 
some exceptions (Imperial College London is heavily focused on science and engineering, 
                                                          
9 Scottish school qualifications are completely different and many students in Scottish HEIs study for a duration 
of 4 years instead of 3. Therefore, we drop Scottish HEIs from this study. 
10 Over 98% of applicants received at least one offer (in 2016). About 70% make the grades by their most preferred 
institution, and around 12% gain places via the clearing mechanism. Only the most selective institutions/subjects 
interview prospective students. 
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while the LSE is focused mostly on social science). However, there are large regional 
differentials in earnings, especially among graduates and we capture these using regional fixed 
effects for London, rest of the South East, Wales and Scotland - relative to the rest of England. 
A large majority of students move straight from high school to university although 
many of the less selective institutions admit a large number of “mature” students and students 
with unconventional entry qualifications. HE completion rates are very high – typically over 
90% and most drop-outs occur close to the start of their studies. UG courses in the UK are quite 
specialized and, nonetheless, the proportion attending graduate school to gain post-graduate 
(PG) qualifications is as common as in the US. Machin and Lindley (2013) find that just over 
one third of graduates in both the UK and the US have PG qualifications. Our default 
specification elects not to control for PG qualifications so that the interpretation of our results 
include the option value of being able to progress to PG. 
4. Data 
Our analysis is based on the Labour Force Survey which is broadly comparable to the 
US Current Population Survey (CPS). The LFS data is a short rotating panel and we first 
construct a sample of employees aged 20 to 60 years old, who hold at least a bachelor (UG) 
degree, using Waves 1 and 5 (the waves that contain earnings and hours of work data), in the 
Quarterly LFS 2012Q1-2015Q2 inclusive, the years for which the information on HEI attended, 
and subject studied, was available.11 We exclude Scottish HEIs because of their different 
secondary school qualifications and their distinctive four-year duration. We exclude all post-
1992 universities that are not also ex-polytechnics, since these are very new HEIs with very 
few observations in our data. We include Medicine (with Dentistry) but exclude Subjects Allied 
to Medicine.12 There are 20,597 observations in our resulting graduate sample. We merge the 
LFS data with collapsed data drawn from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) that 
provides data on the extent of selectivity by institution and course for all graduates since 2001.  
                                                          
11 The data is readily available from the UK Data Service, subject to registering with them and undertaking some 
training. The data is potentially highly disclosive and can only be used via the Citrix server of the UK Data-
Service’s Secure Data Lab. The selectivity data is available from HESA and can, with permission, be merged into 
the LFS. Our own STATA code has been approved for release to other researchers who wish to explore the data.  
12 This group is dominated by nursing, a non-traditional graduate discipline. Note that many (of the higher earning) 
doctors have some self-employed income that is not recorded in our data. Indeed, a significant minority of doctors 
who are in General Practice (i.e. physicians who work in the community) are entirely self-employed and are 
dropped from the analysis altogether. 
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The HESA data we use is based on the individual student records of all A-level scores 
for UK domiciled, full-time, first degree (which excludes a relatively small minority of students 
who study a Foundation Year degree that combine academic and workplace skills) students 
studying at UK HE providers - but only for the entry years 2000/01-2013/14. We derive 
standardised A-level scores by UG entry cohort, HEI and subject, after normalization (with 
zero mean and unity standard deviation) within each cohort. Figures 1A and 1B show the 
average log wage for each subject and institution type, for males and females respectively.13 
On average, RG graduates, both men and women, earn 0.11-0.12 log points more than 
graduates from Old universities; who in turn earn 0.06-0.07 log points more than graduates 
from New  universities. Across subjects, graduates in Medicine and Dentistry have the highest 
wages, followed by Business and Administrative Studies, Social Studies (including 
Economics), Law and then most of the Science, Technology, Engineering and Maths (STEM) 
subjects. The lowest wages subjects tend to be Arts and Humanities disciplines. 
The HESA data contains the A-level scores for all students across all subjects in all 
universities in all cohorts14. We collapse this data to cohort*subject*institution*year cells 
which provides our measure of course selectivity. Figure 2 shows the variation in mean 
selectivity across institutions, on the horizontal axis, and the within institution standard 
deviation on the vertical axis, where the data has been standardized to have zero mean and unit 
variance within each cohort. The mean of the raw data is close to a score associated with BBB 
grades. The size of the institution is indicated by the size of the bubble (for the 79 institutions 
who have a minimum cell size of 15 individuals), and the colour indicates institution type (Dark 
Grey is New; Hollow is Old; and Light Grey is RG). The estimated slope of this population 
relationship is 0.129 (robust SE=0.009 and R2=0.775) and, surprisingly, there is a clear increase 
in institutional variance as we move to more selective institutions. The data neatly divides 
between New, Old and RG, with little overlap. The New HEIs are surprisingly tightly clustered, 
while the RG HEIs have surprisingly large differences within the group. To allow for grade  
  
                                                          
13 The omission of the self-employed is a major drawback of the data and may bias some of our estimated subject 
effects because of the large proportion of self-employed who studied Accountancy, Law, and Medicine/Dentistry. 
14 A-levels are graded with letter scores A*, A, B, C, D, E and then fail, and these are coded into a numerical scale 
by attributing a score to a grade and aggregating the best 3. 
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Figure 1A Log wages by subject and institution type: Men 
 
Figure 1B Log wages by subject and institution type: Women 
 
Note: Full graduate sample (with cell size as in Table 1). Dark grey is New; hollow is Old; light grey is RG.  
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Figure 2:  Standard Deviation and Mean A-Level scores by HEI, All subjects 
 
Note: Dark grey solid circle is New; Black hollow circle is Old; and Light grey solid circle is RG. Fitted line: slope=0.129 (Robust SE=0.009, R2=0.775). 
Minimum cell size is 15. 
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inflation in admission scores, we use the detrended mean standardized A-Level scores from a 
subject-specific regression on a linear time trend, as our preferred measure of selectivity.15  
Figure 3 shows the differences in the degree of selectivity by the three main subject 
groups, and by the three main institutional types. “New” universities are considerably less 
selective than the “Old” (by roughly half of a standard deviation) and, on average require 
modest grades in three A-level at around grades CCC. The “Old” are considerably less selective 
(by roughly another half of a standard deviation) than the “Russell Group” of 24 elite 
institutions that includes Oxford and Cambridge. Old institutions typically require 3 A-levels 
at around grades BBB; while RG institutions typically require three A-level subjects,  at around 
grades AAA, and the very best of them demand three A* grades. Only in Medicine do all HEI 
types demand similar grades. Otherwise, RG and Old are usually much more selective than 
New.  
Figure 3:  Selectivity Scores by Subject and HEI Type 
 
Note: Post-2002 cohorts with actual A-Level scores. Dark grey is New; hollow is Old; light grey is RG.  
                                                          
15 To allow for A-level grade inflation across entry cohorts we detrend the standardized A-Level mean by running 
a regression on the (unadjusted) standardized A-Level mean with full interactions with subject dummies, where 
the interaction terms are jointly significant (p=0.000) as well as individually significant for many subjects. This 
suggests that overlooking subject-specific grade inflation will lead to biased estimates of the effects of selectivity. 
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Table 1 shows the cell sizes for each subject group broken down by HEI type and 
gender in the full sample of graduates. The merged LFS-HESA sample contains 10,602 
graduates who entered HE in 1992 or later, with mean standardised A-Level entry scores 
matched at the HEI-subject (JACS) level for post-2002 UG entry cohorts.16 For 1992-2001 UG 
entry cohorts, which is more than 70% of our data, we impute the missing A-Level scores and 
we subsequently examine the robustness of the results to including this extended sample.17 
Table 1:  Frequencies by subject, HEI type and gender, graduate sample 
 Men Women 
JACS Subject Area New Old RG Total New Old RG Total 
Medicine & dentistry 10* 31 118 159 24 41 173 238 
Biological/Veterinary  200 184 242 626 335 307 380 1,022 
Agriculture & related 46 28 33 107 42 37 54 133 
Physical sciences 189 248 431 868 135 133 211 479 
Maths & computing 374 285 417 1,076 96 88 164 348 
Engineering & tech 523 327 473 1,323 53 32 69 154 
Architect/build/plan 247 55 87 389 69 13 51 133 
Social studies 258 240 344 842 442 332 357 1,131 
Law 117 61 131 309 207 118 136 461 
Bus/admin studies 634 275 252 1,161 645 249 229 1,123 
Mass comms & docs. 119 33 41 193 138 55 58 251 
Languages 41 94 153 288 146 261 330 737 
Historical/philosophic 83 168 226 477 102 140 272 514 
Creative arts & design 260 76 67 403 338 103 102 543 
Education 221 121 185 527 636 382 445 1,463 
Combined 536 398 457 1,391 641 589 500 1,730 
Total 3,858 2,624 3,657 10139 4,049 2,880 3,531 10460 
Note:  *: cell size rounded. The data is our full graduate sample (see sample note for details). New universities refer 
to ex-polytechnics which became universities post-1992. Old universities refer to universities founded pre-1992 
which are not in the Russell Group (RG) of elite pre-92 institutions which form an association of 24 (as of 2012) 
public research-intensive universities, including Oxford and Cambridge.  
 
  
                                                          
16 HESA data for 00/01-01/02 cohorts cannot be used because of inconsistencies in the tariff score calculations. 
17 We test for the robustness with respect to including of the 1992-2001 UG entry cohorts in Section 6. Pre-1991 
cohorts are not used as they pre-date the major HE expansion which gave ex-polytechnics university status.  
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5.       Empirical Methods  
 We begin with least squares estimation in Tables 4 and 5 of section 6 below, where the 
latter table controls for college selectivity. We conduct this exercise as a way of connecting 
ourselves to the existing literature that has depended heavily on least squares. The analysis that 
is implemented in Section 6 extends existing UK work by including the degree of college 
selectivity as a control variable in OLS. In addition, it conducts some robustness checks.  
It seems likely that graduates’ earnings will, to some extent, reflect their pre-university 
test scores – high scoring high school students will, on average, ultimately earn more. It also 
seems possible that students who attend different HEIs will ultimately earn different amounts 
and that this will, in part, reflect different admission requirements on HEIs as well as the 
individual student test scores. In particular, students with the same score but at different 
institutions might well earn different amounts. The regression analysis, even controlling for 
selectivity of institution and subject group, may still not be regarded as providing causal 
estimates. The OLS counterfactual depends on there being no unobservable confounders (i.e. 
selection only on observables) and a parametric functional form assumption (that the 
relationship between wages and A-level test scores was, for example, linear).   
There may be unobserved confounders such as social background, non-cognitive skills, 
and personality traits. The usual approach to this problem is to: either search for instruments 
for the choices that individuals make; or to exploit discontinuities associated with admission 
requirements. In this application, the choice set is so large that it would be difficult to envisage 
a large number of instruments or discontinuities being available. Kirkeboen et al (2016) is the 
exception in the literature. Norway has just a handful of institutions – they are able to do 
precisely this because of the closely observed and rigid nature of the Norwegian HE system 
whereby admission to a course depends only on having at least the requisite high school score, 
and because their data records the next best alternative to the course each student was admitted 
to. In this UK analysis here, we have to rely on the assumption that there is no selection on 
unobservables – an assumption that is a necessary condition for OLS to yield unbiased 
estimates. However, OLS also requires that there is no other form of misspecification in the 
estimated relationship – for example, functional form. Matching methods circumvent the 
second requirement but still requires the former. Matching methods are, however, limited to 
binary treatments. Our application allows for multiple treatments, where we assume that 
selection into each treatment is driven only by observables. While not amenable to matching 
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methods which is applicable only to a single binary treatment, this multiple treatment case can 
be addressed using weighted methods. Like matching methods, weighting can be used to ensure 
treatment groups are similar to the control group by weighting them accordingly. As with 
matching methods this weighting method can yield causal estimates of the Average Treatment 
Effects providing a conditional independence assumption is satisfied that implies that there is 
only selection on observables. 
 In section 7, we explore the treatment effects (assuming selection on observables 
alone) of HEI type and subject on log hourly wages, using the “doubly robust” inverse-
probability weighted regression-adjustment (IPWRA) estimator (see Wooldridge 2007, 
Wooldridge 2010 chapter 13, and Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). In IPWRA the weights are 
the inverse of the predicted probabilities from a multinomial logit first stage that models the 
probabilities of each individual choosing each possible combination of subject and institution. 
In the second stage, this estimator then applies regression methods to the reweighted data. If 
students were randomly assigned to cells then the probabilities would be equal and the 
estimator is equivalent to unweighted least squares. On the other hand, if the researcher knows 
the true specification of the relationship between log wages and the X’s, for example that it is 
linear in variables, then weighting observations arbitrarily will not affect the analysis. If the 
functional form is correct then the OLS estimates are unaffected by any weighting. However, 
since we seldom know the true functional form this is not very reassuring and relying on 
linearity to compare observations with others that fail to have overlap is unlikely to prove 
reliable. IPWRA weights observations in the sparse parts of the distribution more heavily. 
Imagine, for the sake of the exposition, that there are just three institutions (a, b and c) and just 
one subject (see Figure 4 below). Students apply to institutions before their test scores are 
known and suppose that the test score was a simple scalar figure. Institutions differ in terms of 
their “selectivity” (i.e. the test score level that their applicants require to gain admission). 
Individuals are made offers of a place at each of the institutions they apply to and these offers 
are conditional on test score achieved. Suppose that a is more selective than b, and b is more 
selective than c. Individuals are limited to apply to a small number of institutions (say just one 
for the purposes of this exposition). Some individuals who fail to make the critical test score 
to meet the condition of their offer from some institution might nonetheless gain a place at that 
institution – for example, this might be allowed if the institution finds itself with spare capacity, 
perhaps because many other students wanting this subject have also underperformed. If not, 
they might seek a place elsewhere, at a less selective institution, where spare capacity might 
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exist. Thus, there may be a few students at highly selective institutions that have relatively low 
test scores. Equally, there might be some students who attend less selective institutions where 
they easily made the grade for admission but who had decided to attend this weaker institution 
for idiosyncratic reasons.  
Therefore, there will be a distribution of test scores within institutions, as well as 
differences in the average scores across institutions. Importantly, the distributions of individual 
test scores at similarly selective institution are likely to overlap. For example, the lower tail of 
the distribution for institution a is likely to overlap with the upper tail of the distribution for b, 
and the upper tail of scores at c is likely to overlap with the bottom tail of the scores at b. Even 
thought there is no overlap between institutions a and c, the existence of b facilitates support 
for both a and b.  
Had we omitted institution b the results would be highly dependent on the validity of 
the assumption that the relationship between wages and scores was additive and linear - i.e. 
that the relationships are parallel across institutions. If this assumption is true, as Figure 4 
suggests, then the weight that we attach to each observation is irrelevant – OLS would provide 
unbiased estimates of slope and intercepts irrespective of how the observations were weighted. 
The additive linearity assumption is strong – but it allows us to extrapolate the effect of test 
scores on wages across the test score distribution, even to those parts of the distribution where 
data is sparse. If the functional form assumptions of linearity and additivity were correct we 
could rely on the differences in the estimated OLS intercepts in Figure 4 to provide measures 
of institutional relative value added. The essence of OLS is that all observations are equally 
weighted and that the counterfactual wage is obtained from a linear prediction. 
One solution to the sparsity of data in the left and right tails for the top and bottom 
institutions is to attach greater weight to observations that do occur in the range where the data 
is sparse. This is what the Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) method does. If we over-
weighted the weakest students in the best institution then this would improve the overlap with 
all weaker institutions, and not just the next weakest one. Similarly, if we over-weighted the 
best students in the weakest institution we would also improve the overlap with all better 
institutions, not just the next worst. It is this property, that weighting improves overlap between 
all pairs of institutions, that gives IPWRA its advantage over estimation methods that rely on 
matching just pairs of institutions together.  It is only by including intermediate institutions is 
it possible to estimate the effect of HEI and subject on wage outcomes across all cells. In  
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Figure 4: IPWRA methodology 
 
Note: The dots indicate hypothetical students at institutions a, b and c respectively. 
The dashed lines fit the relationship between wages on test scores in a linear regression 
with additive institutional fixed effects. 
particular, not including institution b would result in their being little common support between 
institutions a and c.  This is the single robustness property – one that OLS also possesses. 
Figure 4 illustrates why this works. By increasing the weight of the weakest students in the top 
institution and the strongest in the bottom we can examine the validity of the assumption that 
one can linearly extrapolate from the dense part of the data. Figure 4 is drawn such that linearity 
is true and so the extreme individuals happen to lie close to the fitted linear line and therefore 
the weight given to them would make little difference to the estimates.  
In practice, the weights are obtained by modelling the probability that an individual 
belongs to a particular cell – in our case defined by HE subject and institution. There are, in 
our data, very many cells and modelling such a large range of choices is impractical with the 
small survey data available since many cells will have very few observations within them. The 
natural way of modelling such choices is using a multinomial logit first stage. This provides 
predicted probabilities of being in a particular cell which can be used to change the contribution 
of each observation in the second stage where a weighted least squares regression is run.  
Indeed, IPWRA is doubly robust in the sense that the estimates of the second step, the 
wage equation, are robust to misspecification in the weighting of the data conditional on the 
specification of the second step being correct; and the estimates of the second step are robust 
to misspecification of the second step provided the weighting step is correctly specified. That 
{ PAGE   \* MERGEFORMAT } 
 
is, only one step needs to be specified correctly. IPWRA estimates the average treatment effect 
(ATE) of any HEI type and subject group relative to an omitted category allowing for selection 
into a particular HEI type and subject, relative to the omitted category, using multinomial logit 
model in the first step. Due to concerns of cell sizes and common support, we group the subjects 
into STEM, Social Sciences and Arts & Humanities.  
6.  Ordinary Least Squares Results 
Before we turn to the effect of HE selectivity, we first present conventional wage 
equations as a benchmark in Table 2, for men and women separately, using the full graduate 
sample. In contrast to the results presented in Walker and Zhu (2013), where the LFS data did 
not include HEI, here we provide estimates that include HEI type differentials - which we could 
only provide in our earlier work from a separate survey.18 In columns (1) and (3), we include 
HEI type, while in (2) and (4) we additionally control for degree subjects.  We resist the 
temptation to control for PG qualifications, so these results should be interpreted as including 
the option value of the possibility of pursuing PG studies. Even though family circumstances 
such as partnership status and the number of children are correlated with wages and with HEI 
type and subject, we find that controlling for family circumstances made no significant 
difference to these estimates. The wage coefficients for attending Russell Group are robust at 
around 9% for men and 11% for women relative to New university graduates. Old university, 
relative to New, are similarly stable and are approximately 7% for men and 5% for women and 
these estimates are statistically significantly different to both RG and New. The subject 
differentials reflect those in Walker and Zhu (2013) with large positive effects for 
Medicine/Dentistry, Law, Business Studies, and Maths, relative to the Languages omitted 
subject; and large negative ones for other Arts subjects.  
In order to assess the value-added of HEIs, we include a full set of HEI fixed effects in the 
results reported in Table 3 using the post-1992 entry sample with actual or imputed standardized 
A-Level scores,19 as opposed to the HEI type indicators in Table 2. But we omit detailed subject 
controls for the moment because institutions would be dropped if they did not provide all 
                                                          
18 In Appendix Table A1 we replicate the Walker and Zhu (2103) specification but we extend the sample and we 
are now able to add the selectivity variable. The results remain very similar to those in the 2013 report in terms 
of the effect of major, and these remain insensitive to the inclusion of additional controls. 
19 We exclude HEIs with fewer than 15 graduates in the post-1992 graduate sample. This resulted in a small 
reduction of the sample size to 10,602 instead of 10,627 as in Table 1. Table A2 compares results that use imputed 
selectivity for the graduates who predated our HESA selectivity data with results on the post-2002 sample only 
so imputation is not required.   
{ PAGE   \* MERGEFORMAT } 
 
subjects. We control for age, age squared, non-white, and regions but only report the coefficient 
for institutional selectivity. Controlling for HEI-fixed effects, a 1 SD increase in selectivity 
(roughly corresponding to the gap between RG and New universities on average) increases 
hourly wage by 0.08 log points for both men and women. This is only a little larger than 
previous estimates reflecting the young nature of graduates used in previous work20.  
Table 2:  Wage equations without selectivity, PG or degree class controls  
 MEN WOMEN 
Old university 0.058*** 0.065*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
RG university 0.099*** 0.091*** 0.119*** 0.106*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Medicine &   0.426***  0.448*** 
dentistry  (0.038)  (0.029) 
Bio/Veterinary 
sciences 
 0.054*  0.081*** 
 (0.029)  (0.021) 
Agriculture &   0.012  0.009 
related  (0.051)  (0.040) 
Physical   0.102***  0.071*** 
sciences  (0.029)  (0.025) 
Mathematics &   0.172***  0.191*** 
computing  (0.028)  (0.029) 
Engineering &   0.225***  0.149*** 
technology  (0.027)  (0.039) 
Architecture, 
build & plan 
 0.142***  0.059 
 (0.032)  (0.041) 
Social studies  0.078***  0.065*** 
  (0.029)  (0.020) 
Law  0.171***  0.145*** 
  (0.034)  (0.028) 
Business & admin 
studies 
 0.208***  0.152*** 
 (0.028)  (0.021) 
Mass comms & 
documents 
 -0.057  0.021 
 (0.039)  (0.030) 
History & philosophy  -0.050  0.002 
 (0.032)  (0.026) 
Creative arts &   -0.045  -0.088*** 
design  (0.033)  (0.024) 
Education  0.052*  0.123*** 
  (0.030)  (0.019) 
Combined  0.100***  0.060*** 
  (0.028)  (0.019) 
Constant 
 
-0.272*** -0.271*** -0.092 -0.084 
(0.099) (0.101) (0.089) (0.088) 
Observations 10137 10137 10460 10460 
R2 0.276 0.308 0.210 0.240 
Note: Robust standard errors (RSE) in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Omitted category: New (post-
1992); Languages; born in the 80’s or 90’s; survey year=2012. We do not report on variables not of direct interest: 
born in the 50’s, 60’s, 70’s; year; age and age squared; non-white; and region effects. 
                                                          
20  Experimenting with including higher moments of the selectivity scores we found them to be sometimes 
statistically significant, but they do not affect the coefficients of other key variables, or the R2. 
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Table 3:  Wage equations with HEI fixed effects and selectivity controls  
 Male Female Pooled 
Selectivity 0.078*** 0.086*** 0.084*** 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.008) 
Observations 4938 5664 10602 
R2 0.388 0.327 0.363 
Note: SE in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Parameter estimates for age, age squared, non-white, 
regions, year, and cohort fixed effects are not reported. The HEI fixed-effect estimates are presented in Figure 7.  
The estimated institutional fixed effects, for pooled men and women, from the 
estimation in Table 3 (using the pooled column estimates) are plotted in Figures 5 and 6.  These 
present scatter plots of estimated HEI fixed effects (relative to MMU) unadjusted for selectivity 
(Figure 5) and adjusted for the degree of selectivity (Figure 6), for all subjects pooled together. 
The choice of MMU as the omitted category is entirely benign – any other choice would leave 
the relative effects unchanged. MMU is, nonetheless, a good numeraire because it is one of the 
largest HEIs, it offers a full range of subjects, and is close to the average level of selectivity. 
Each dot represents a unique HEI fixed effect with a given mean A-Level admission 
score on the horizontal axis, and the mean unadjusted (for both HEI and subject) wage on the 
vertical axis; and the size of the bubble is proportional to the number of graduates from that 
HEI in the sample. In Figure 5, the A-Level scores on the x-axis, shows that graduates from 
more selective HEI’s (that demand higher scores) earn significantly more than graduates of 
less selective HEI’s that demand lower grades  - the dashed black line, with a slope of 0.190 
(robust standard error of 0.013), reflects a weighted least square regression of the unadjusted 
HEI fixed-effect estimates on standardized entry scores) – there would appear to be a large 
return to attending a more selective HEI.  
In contrast, when we control for course selectivity (using the pooled column estimates 
from Table 3) in Figure 6, we find much lower HEI fixed effects wage differentials, on average 
- the dashed fitted line is much flatter with a slope of 0.107 (Robust SE=0.013), reflecting a 
weighted least square regression of the effect of selectivity-adjusted HEI fixed-effect estimates 
on standardized entry scores. Failing to control for HEI selectivity gives the mistaken 
impression that more selective HEIs add considerably more value, when in fact approximately 
half of this is due to their greater selectivity.  
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Figure 5:  Scatter plots of unadjusted HEI fixed effects 
 
Note: Dark grey is New; Black hollow is Old; and light grey is RG. The size of the bubble indicates institution size. Fitted line: slope=0.190 (rse=0.013), R2=0.675.  
Omitted HEI: MMU. 
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Figure 6:  Scatter plots of selectivity adjusted HEI fixed effects, all subjects 
 
Note: Dark grey is New; black hollow is Old; and light grey is RG. The size of the bubble indicates institution size. Fitted line: slope=0.107 (rse=0.013), R2=0.394. 
Omitted HEI: MMU.
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The analysis above pools all subjects. Yet we know that there are considerable 
differences in selectivity by subject, as well as by institution, and there are some differences in 
subject mix across institutions that may confound the analysis. However, when we addressed 
both subject and HEI selectivity we found that including subject into the analysis seems not to 
affect the general message from contrasting Figures 5 and 6. 
The further message of Figure 6 is that we estimate that there are large differences 
across institutions with similar levels of selectivity. For example, Exeter is 0.1 below the 
expected level of the fixed effect, while UCL has a fixed effect that is 0.1 higher than expected. 
A student that would expect to gain admission to Exeter would be considerably better off going 
to UCL because of its much higher value added (i.e. the estimated institutional fixed effect). 
Similarly, an average student at the very selective Cambridge would earn as much if she had 
attended the substantially less selective Aston. 
In Figure 7 we show the distribution of estimated relative (to MMU) value added not 
controlling for course selectivity, with the associated confidence intervals, ranked by value-
added. The institutions are grouped from New, Old, RG across the figure.  
The overall highest ten are Imperial College (London), London School of Economics, 
University College London, Oxford, Aston (a university in Birmingham whose main focus is 
management courses), and then Bath, Cambridge, Warwick, Newcastle, and Nottingham. Only 
Aston and Bath in this list are outside the RG elite institutions.  
The overall lowest rated ten institutions include Essex which is a highly regarded “Old” 
institution.21  Between these two extremes there are few institutions that are significantly 
different from zero (i.e. from MMU). The point estimates are relatively imprecise, but they 
suggest that more than 70% of the estimated institutional fixed effects lie within ± 10% of 
MMU and about 40% lie within ± 5% of MMU.  
                                                          
21 The bottom 10 of the Old HEIs includes three other “Old” institutions that are unusual – Lampeter is a very 
small Welsh institution that offers a limited range of subjects; Goldsmith College is small and specializes in music; 
while the OU is large but caters mainly for atypical students who study part-time and almost entirely through 
distance learning. 
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Figure 7:  Estimated Value Added Distributions, all subjects  
 
Note: New institutions are portrayed in the block on the left; Old are in the middle block, and RG are in the rightmost block. The vertical axis is relative (to MMU) 
value added from the HEI fixed effects. The horizontal axis is the position in the overall rank of all HEIs – the gaps in each block demonstrate that the rankings 
overlap institution types. The vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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Finally, Figure 8 shows the scatter plot of the adjusted and unadjusted value-added 
figures (again all relative to MMU). It is very clear that the RG institutions have substantially 
lower value-added once one controls for their selectivity (i.e they lie above the 45o line); while 
the difference between adjusted and unadjusted for Old universities is somewhat smaller; and 
the difference for New institutions is very close to zero. Note that the average wage differential 
between MMU graduates and non-graduates is of the order of 25% so the absolute graduate 
premium (i.e. the wage rate for marginal university graduates, who typically attend the New 
HEIs, vs high-school graduates who could, in principle, have attended a New HEI) is 
nonetheless positive, on average, for all New HEIs.  
There are a number of robustness checks that we performed. 17.5% of graduates in our 
sample do not hold at least 2 A-Levels – many of whom have unconventional qualifications. 
So, we first check the robustness of estimated adjusted value-added distributions by excluding 
those without at least 2 A-Levels from the analysis.  The pattern of results looks almost 
identical to those in Figures 5 and 6 reflecting the stability of the extent of institutional 
selectivity over time - in particular the effect of institutional selectivity remains similar whether 
we omit students who have unconventional qualifications or not.  
Secondly, while Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8 are for all subjects, we find that decomposing 
each of these figures into three separate broad subject groups makes no important differences 
to the ordering, and the pattern is similar - with a small and similar group significantly better 
than MMU, another small and similar group significantly worse, and a large range of 
institutions that have value added insignificantly different from MMU in each subject. The 
implication is that subject selectivity affects all institutions more or less equally.  
Thirdly, Table 4 assesses the sensitivity of returns to HEI types and subjects with 
respect to institutional selectivity, without and with controlling for post-graduate degrees (we 
group all such degrees together, and degree class (we code “First” and “Upper Second”, that 
around half of students achieve, as “good” compared to the lower classifications). This table 
corresponds to Table 3 for men, women and pooled respectively, but now with subject controls 
added and HEI fixed effects replaced by HEI-type controls. The wage premia for studying at 
Russell Group universities as opposed to New universities are substantial, for both men and 
women. Moreover, getting a good degree or PG qualification also carry significant wage 
premia. However, they do not appear to matter for the coefficients of A-Level scores or HEI 
types for both genders. This pattern implies that our key estimates of the HEI value added are 
insensitive to how we control for PG qualifications or UG degree class. 
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Figure 8:  Value Added distributions controlling for selectivity and not.  
 
Note: Dark grey is New, black hollow is Old, and light grey is RG. Minimum cell size (graduates per HEI) is 15
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A final concern is that the effect of college selectivity might vary with the years of 
employment since graduation. This might arise if course selectivity generates some value as 
a signal – since employers know little about their employees’ productivities soon after 
graduation, they may use college selectivity as a signal. We might expect the value of such a 
signal would diminish as new information about productivity is revealed by work experience. 
In the first 3 columns of Table 5 we replicate Table 4, but now adding years since graduation 
and its interaction to the selectivity measure. There seems to be no evidence of such an effect 
for men; and for women it even appears that a more selective degree has a value in the market 
that increases, albeit only slowly, with tenure. In the last 3 columns, we only allow the effect 
of selectivity to vary with age up to the median age in our sample (32 and 31 for men and 
women respectively). The primary finding is that the estimate of the effect of HEI selectivity 
using new graduates is much higher (0.08 compared to 0.045) for the younger group of men 
(but not women). 
It is difficult to compare our results with those in the existing literature. The closest, 
and best, work comes from Britton et al (2016) which uses income tax records matched to 
student loan information that records institution and subject. Their data is effectively the 
population of loan recipients and the income data is annual taxable income. But the earnings 
history is for, at most, 10 years after graduation. Moreover, the names of institutions were 
regarded as confidential by the data providers and only a subset of RG institutions agreed to 
be revealed. They report median earnings (and self-employed income) and their Figures 9 and 
11, for female and male respectively, show the same general shape as our Figure 7 with a long 
flat range with a small number of institutions in the top and bottom tails that are statistically 
significant. There is considerable overlap in their top 10 institutions and ours. 
As far as subject is concerned, Britton et al (2016) report a hockey-stick of median 
earnings in which Medicine and Economics are considerably higher than a long shallow 
plateau of fields of study which is led by Engineering, Law, and Physical Sciences; while the 
left tail of this plateau is dominated by Arts and Humanities. Similar findings can be seen in 
US research, for example, by Altonji et al (2012) which uses the large US American 
Community Survey (ACS) that is similar to our LFS data.  Course selectivity has been 
extensively studied in the US literature, but there are just a handful of estimates for the UK. 
Our estimates are approximately 10% for a 1 SD increase in selectivity – from Figure 6 and 
Table 3. This is slightly larger than other UK estimates although our analysis is for a much 
longer range on ages. Dale and Krueger (2019) provide an 6.8% estimate of the effect of what 
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Table 4:  Wage equations without and with PG and degree class controls 
 Men Women All 
 Subjects PG & Good 
Degree 
Subjects PG & 
Good 
Degree 
Subjects PG & Good 
Degree 
Course  0.078*** 0.075*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.073*** 
selectivity (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) 
Old university 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.022 0.003 0.037*** 0.026** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) 
RG university 0.052*** 0.043*** 0.082*** 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.058*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) 
Female     -0.101*** -0.114*** 
     (0.008) (0.008) 
Good Degree (I/2I)  0.104***  0.087***  0.094*** 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.008) 
PG indicator  0.039***  0.114***  0.079*** 
  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.009) 
Constant -0.819*** -0.942*** -0.991*** -0.978*** -0.814*** -0.858*** 
 (0.216) (0.217) (0.198) (0.197) (0.147) (0.146) 
Observations 4938 4938 5664 5664 10602 10602 
R2 0.390 0.402 0.334 0.351 0.372 0.386 
Note: Robust SE in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Merged LFS/HESA graduate sample (see 
sample notes for details). Institutional fixed effects not reported. Omitted category: New (post-1992) universities; 
Lower Second Class or Below (2II) degree; Languages. We do not report the coefficients on subject which are 
similar to before. 
 
Table 5:  Wage equations with selectivity interacted with years since graduation 
 Full age range Below Median Age 
 Men Women All Men Women All 
Course 0.045** 0.017 0.029** 0.080*** 0.017 0.030** 
Selectivity (0.021) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.014) 
Years since graduation 0.031*** -0.006 0.010 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Years since graduation 0.003 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.001 0.005*** 0.004*** 
* selectivity (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Old university 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.022 0.003 0.037*** 0.026** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011) 
RG university 0.044*** 0.071*** 0.058*** 0.043*** 0.071*** 0.058*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) 
Female   -0.113***   -0.113*** 
   (0.008)   (0.008) 
Good Degree (I/2I) 0.104*** 0.088*** 0.094*** 0.103*** 0.088*** 0.094*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) 
PG indicator 0.037*** 0.113*** 0.078*** 0.039*** 0.113*** 0.078*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.009) 
Constant -0.278 -1.134*** -0.654*** -0.940*** -0.991*** -0.878*** 
 (0.319) (0.291) (0.216) (0.249) (0.211) (0.160) 
Observations 4938 5664 10602 4938 5664 10602 
R2 0.403 0.353 0.386 0.402 0.353 0.386 
Note: Robust SE in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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is an approximately ½ SD of college entry SATs scores, that do not adjust for selection into 
college; while our unadjusted estimate implied by Figure 6 is close to 20% for a 1SD increase 
in selectivity. Thus, our estimate is higher. They also report the effects of college selectivity 
that control for average college entry scores and find statistically insignificant results, while 
our own equivalent estimates are close to 10%. 
 
7. Inverse Probability Weighted Regression Adjustment estimates 
 It is clear from Table 1 that the data would not support the estimation of effects of a 
large number of cells defined by both subject and institution without relying on the additive 
linear functional form assumptions. Fortunately, there is a natural way of collapsing institutions 
into three distinct types: RG, Old and New. Similarly, there is a natural way of collapsing 
subjects into three types: STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics), Social 
Sciences, and Arts & Humanities. The resulting nine cells (for males and females separately) 
have a minimum of 5% of their respective sample sizes of over 4000 graduates.  
 Table 6 presents the mean selectivity scores and frequencies for each of the 3 by 3 HEI 
type * subject group combinations, for men and women separately. It is clear that there is larger 
variation in A-Level scores across HEI types than across subjects, conditional on type. On the 
other hand, the variation in frequencies across gender reflects the differences in subject 
popularity, e.g. women appear to prefer Social Sciences and Arts & Humanities to STEM, 
relative to men.  Indeed, the differences across gender in some cells suggests that men and 
women are choosing different subjects within those subject groups.  
Table 6: Average selectivity across HEI type and subjects 
 Men Women 
 A-Level Mean Obs A-Level Mean Obs 
New – STEM -0.474 801 -0.422 432 
New - Social Science -0.456 539 -0.476 722 
New - Arts & Humanities -0.434 313 -0.456 472 
Old – STEM 0.074 485 0.175 321 
Old - Social Science 0.015 286 0.043 362 
Old - Arts & Humanities -0.016 212 -0.016 280 
RG – STEM 0.510 819 0.582 645 
RG - Social Science 0.391 362 0.471 418 
RG - Arts & Humanities 0.360 255 0.390 437 
Total -0.018 4,072 0.017 4,089 
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We proceed from the most restrictive case where we assume that the broad subject 
choice is effectively pre-determined at age 18, and students simply choose what HEI type to 
attend reflecting their view of what is appropriate for their ability and background. This seems 
like a natural restriction to place on the data since it reflects the reality that the subject choices 
are heavily restricted by decisions made at 16, while HEI type is selected at 18 according to 
one’s perceptions of likely attainment in these school subjects. This, in Table 7 we report the 
effects of HEI type conditional on broad subject. The Average Treatment Effect from the 
IPWRA for men applying to STEM courses is close to 16% for both Old and RG compared to 
the omitted New HEI-type. For those men applying to Social Sciences, the ATE is about 8% 
for attending an Old HEI and 14% for a RG HEI relative to New. And for those men applying 
to Arts and Humanities courses the ATEs are not significantly different from New. These ATEs 
are somewhat larger when estimated by IPWRA than when estimated using OLS even though 
this allows for the effect of course selectivity. Surprisingly, we estimate negative effects for 
women of attending an Old HEI relative to New for STEM and for Arts and Humanities. It is 
not clear why these results should differ from those for men. We suspect that the subject mix 
within broad fields might be different between men and women and also between New and 
other HEIs. This will not become clear until we are able to acquire administrative data to boost 
cell sizes to allow more disaggregation. 
 Table 8 reports the ATE estimates of HEI type-subject combination (all relative to 
New-STEM) on wages as well as the corresponding OLS estimates. That is, it relaxes the 
restriction in Table 7 that subject is predetermined.  
The full set of the IPWRA estimates for Table 8 for the control variables are reported 
in the Appendix Tables A3 and A4 for men and women respectively. Those tables include the 
estimates of both the outcome equations (wages) and the estimates of the determinants of the 
treatment effects, i.e. the multinomial logit estimates. The wage effects of institution and 
subject types in Table 8 suggest that OLS substantially underestimates the effect of attending 
the more prestigious HEIs for men. The effects of Old and RG STEM are not significantly 
different from each other, but they are approximately 15% greater than New-STEM. Using 
OLS for men we find no significant effect of Old-STEM relative to New-STEM and a 
somewhat smaller effect of RG-STEM. For women, Old and RG STEM are not significantly 
different than New-STEM.  There appear to be no significant Arts and Humanities effects for 
men in RG or Old relative to New. Although, for men, RG-SocSci is large and significantly 
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Table 7: IPWRA of HEI type on wages, conditional on broad subjects 
  Men   Women  
 
OLS 
STEM Social 
Science 
Arts & 
Humanities 
STEM Social 
Science 
Arts & 
Humanities 
Old 0.043* 0.069** 0.061 -0.060* 0.013 -0.024 
 (0.023) (0.031) (0.039) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) 
RG 0.120*** 0.093*** 0.043 0.052 0.040 0.047 
 (0.025) (0.035) (0.044) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) 
Selectivity 0.077*** 0.063** 0.075** 0.145*** 0.131*** 0.049* 
 (0.017) (0.026) (0.036) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) 
Observations 2105 1187 780 1398 1502 1189 
R2 0.400 0.405 0.384 0.342 0.341 0.386 
ATE IPWRA       
Old 0.156*** 0.078** 0.018 -0.081** 0.028 -0.096*** 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.034) (0.041) (0.028) (0.033) 
RG 0.162*** 0.138*** 0.058 -0.005 0.108*** -0.053 
 (0.034) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.036) (0.036) 
Observations 2103 1187 765 1397 1502 1186 
IPWRA stands for inverse probability weighted regression adjustment. Robust SE in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. Omitted category: New Universities. Other controls include age, age squared, nonwhite, 
dummies for decade of birth, survey years, and regions. PG and good degree dummies only enter the outcome 
(wage) equations but not the treatment (selection) equations in the IPWRA. 
Table 8: IPWRA and OLS estimates of HEI type and broad subjects on wages 
 IPWRA Average Treatment Effects OLS 
 Men Women Pooled Men Women Pooled 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
New  0.075*** -0.071** -0.007 0.007 0.010 0.003 
Social Science (0.029) (0.031) (0.025) (0.020) (0.023) (0.015) 
New   -0.010 -0.050 -0.040 -0.155*** -0.065*** -0.106*** 
Arts & Humanities (0.036) (0.035) (0.030) (0.025) (0.024) (0.017) 
Old  0.161*** -0.047 0.054* 0.038* -0.053* -0.001 
STEM (0.031) (0.037) (0.028) (0.022) (0.028) (0.017) 
Old  0.133*** -0.036 0.045 0.085*** 0.032 0.055*** 
Social Science (0.036) (0.033) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.020) 
Old 0.003 -0.156*** -0.077*** -0.090*** -0.121*** -0.110*** 
Arts & Humanities (0.037) (0.033) (0.028) (0.031) (0.030) (0.021) 
RG  0.153*** 0.039 0.102*** 0.115*** 0.071*** 0.092*** 
STEM (0.033) (0.041) (0.030) (0.023) (0.027) (0.017) 
RG   0.196*** 0.049 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.070** 0.086*** 
Social Science (0.041) (0.038) (0.031) (0.027) (0.029) (0.020) 
RG  0.027 -0.119*** -0.065** -0.104*** -0.072*** -0.084*** 
Arts & Humanities (0.039) (0.038) (0.032) (0.030) (0.028) (0.020) 
Female      -0.131*** 
      (0.009) 
Selectivity    0.071*** 0.123*** 0.097*** 
   (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) 
Observations 3950 4083 8138 4072 4089 8161 
R2    0.404 0.355 0.391 
IPWRA stands for inverse probability weighted regression adjustment. Robust SE in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. The observations which are off common support are excluded from the treatment effect models. 
Other controls include age, age squared, nonwhite, dummies for decade of birth, survey years, and regions. PG 
and good degree dummies only enter the outcome (wage) equations but not the treatment (selection) equations in 
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the IPWRA specifications. We do not report the coefficients for selectivity in the IPWRA estimates because there 
is one coefficient for each potential outcome – too many to report. The same applies to the female dummy. 
 
different to Old-SocSci, which in turn is significant greater than New-SocSci. The same is true 
for OLS estimates although these are again considerably underestimated relative to IPWRA. 
The OLS control for subject group and HEI type selectivity, but these findings are not sensitive 
to the exclusion of the selectivity control.  
The results here are hard to compare with others in the literature. To date there is no 
other IPWRA work on either field of study effects or on institutional effects. The closest work 
is the Norwegian research by Kirkeboen et al (2016) which uses IVs based on multiple RDs 
and so control for selection on unobservables. Norway has the advantage of administrative data 
that covers the whole population together with a small number of institutions, and they consider 
a relatively small number of broad fields. The distribution of estimated institutional effects 
resembles our results earlier in that there is no significant difference across most institutions. 
Indeed, only NHH (in Bergen) is significantly better than the rest in Norway. Unlike the UK, 
which is small with many institutions within easy reach of the overwhelming majority of 
students, Norway is larger with relatively large distances between the major cities which limits 
choices somewhat. Thus, their work pays close attention to the subject studied relative to the 
next most preferred subject, whereas the vast majority of students will apply to the same subject 
at several places. Nonetheless, their estimated returns by subject look similar to our ranking. 
 
8.  Conclusions and Implications 
We study the graduate relative wage premia in the UK – between subjects and between 
institutions. Our aspiration is to estimate value-added by institution and by subject. We do not 
directly consider the absolute returns – i.e. the wage differentials between college and no 
college22. Nonetheless the usual selection on unobservable problems pervade the analysis – 
although there is a good case for thinking that subject is predetermined by earlier choices in 
senior high school, there is no case for thinking that the same is true of institution. Unlike 
earlier UK studies, we are able to consider the effect of differences in UG degree subjects, in 
particular the selectivity of the subject at the institution attended. This is important, since earlier 
studies from the US (e.g. Loury and Garman 1995) have shown that omitting university 
                                                          
22 See Blundell et al (2018) for the most recent work on the LFS data used here that focusses on the absolute 
return (i.e. the college premium) on average across all subjects/institutions, which shows that this has been 
remarkably stable across cohorts of students despite the massive expansion of the UK HE system that has 
dramatically increased the supply of graduates into the labour market. 
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performance might lead to biased estimates of the effects of college selectivity. Our results 
show that UG degree programme selectivity, as proxied by de-trended A-Level admission 
scores of the degree programme attended, plays an important role in explaining the variation 
in the graduate wage premium across HEI types and subjects. Moreover, the extent to which 
more selective institutions add value varies substantially by subject.  
The primary finding is that there is a selectivity effect on wages in the UK. The 
corollary of this is that estimated value added for the elite institutions is exaggerated by least 
squares. This is an important finding because there is a strong policy emphasis in encouraging 
wider access to elite HEIs and these estimates suggest that the differences in value-added do 
not support such a strong emphasis because much of the observed wage differentials across 
graduates reflect their pre-HE ability. We subsequently estimate treatment effects (that are 
based on the assumption of selection on observables only) using the IPWRA method. Here we 
find strong differences by subject type as well as institution type for men. The returns to STEM 
exceed those to Social Sciences for both Old and RG institutions, but the effect of Arts and 
Humanities for both RG and Old are not significantly different from that for New.  
While the research throws up new findings on the effects, and side-effects, of selectivity 
we cannot say what causes these findings. The fact that more selective institutions generate 
greater value-added on average might be due to a number of factors. A traditional explanation 
would point to signalling, but the large variance across similar institutions that we uncover 
would be difficult to fit into such an interpretation. An alternative explanation is that more 
research-intensive institutions add more value through turning students into higher productivity 
workers.  Finally, it could be that it is the selection mechanism itself that generates strong peer 
effects.  
Irrespective of the transmission mechanisms, the work is important for policy. The 
funding of HE in the UK has changed radically in the last two decades and the costs of study 
has been focussed increasingly on the students themselves through a combination of high 
tuition fees and a sophisticated income contingent loan scheme. Two notable aspects of the 
new system are that: there is very little variation in fees across subjects or institutions, and yet 
the costs of providing tuition varies greatly across subjects. UK HEIs are independent of 
government and are free to charge whatever they wish up to a maximum that has been set by 
the government. Almost all courses are priced at the same maximum fee: despite the fact that 
different courses have radically different financial returns on average; and despite the large 
differences in the costs of provision. The costs of providing some courses (Arts and Humanities 
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and Social Sciences) are well below the tuition fee, while the costs of other courses (STEM 
and especially Medicine and Dentistry) exceed the tuition fee. Universities are engaging in 
extensive cross-subsidisation. There is other research which suggests that there is a strong 
social gradient in the subject and institution choices that students make. Our research suggests 
that these choices can have important long run consequences that would adversely affect social 
mobility. This adverse effect is exacerbated by the cross subsidies that are occurring. That is, 
low SES students are more likely to choose to attend institutions that offer lower value added, 
and they tend to choose courses that have lower value added. Perversely, these “bad” subject 
choices cross-subsidise the costs of tuition for high SES students who are more likely to choose 
higher value-added courses. Moreover, the means-tested nature of loan repayments implies that 
students who choose low return subjects/institutions are likely to repay a smaller proportion of 
their notional debt - which is ultimately covered by the taxpayer. That is, taxpayers are 
ultimately subsidising students to take low return subjects, whose tuition fees then cross-
subsidise other students to take high return students. Such inequities and inefficiencies persist 
partly because students do not have good information about the consequences of their choices. 
This paper is a small contribution to alleviating that ignorance. Much more detailed work is 
required to quantify the consequences. 
Of course, students choose their courses for many reasons and value-added might well 
be a small element of the drivers of their choices. Some subjects might be low value-added that 
make them a poor financial investment but generate large consumption benefits. The means-
tested nature of the loan scheme provides important subsidies for high consumption / low 
investment courses and, to the extent to which students are aware of such subsidies, this might 
exacerbate this inefficiency. 
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Appendix 
Table A1:  Weekly earnings equations without and with PG and degree class controls 
 Men Women All 
 + Subjects + PG & Good 
Degree 
+ Subjects + PG & Good 
Degree 
+ Subjects + PG & Good 
Degree 
Selectivity  0.080*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.077*** 0.075*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) 
Old university 0.041** 0.039** 0.015 -0.006 0.026* 0.015 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) 
RG university 0.059*** 0.052*** 0.094*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.069*** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) 
Female     -0.265*** -0.278*** 
     (0.010) (0.010) 
Medicine & dentistry 0.434*** 0.481*** 0.457*** 0.488*** 0.456*** 0.494*** 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.048) (0.050) (0.039) (0.039) 
Biological/Veterinary 
sciences 
0.015 0.035 0.063* 0.055 0.048 0.052* 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.036) (0.036) (0.030) (0.030) 
Agriculture & related 0.130 0.148* 0.022 0.034 0.065 0.076 
 (0.082) (0.081) (0.065) (0.066) (0.052) (0.051) 
Physical sciences 0.122** 0.143*** 0.081* 0.070 0.107*** 0.109*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.046) (0.045) (0.032) (0.031) 
Mathematics &  0.193*** 0.216*** 0.183*** 0.180*** 0.183*** 0.196*** 
computing (0.051) (0.051) (0.056) (0.056) (0.031) (0.031) 
Engineering &  0.231*** 0.239*** 0.208*** 0.195*** 0.238*** 0.237*** 
technology (0.051) (0.050) (0.065) (0.065) (0.031) (0.031) 
Architecture, building 
& planning 
0.181*** 0.180*** 0.129** 0.104* 0.176*** 0.162*** 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.060) (0.060) (0.036) (0.036) 
Social studies 0.152*** 0.165*** 0.033 0.035 0.082*** 0.088*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.038) (0.038) (0.030) (0.030) 
Law 0.130** 0.147** 0.130*** 0.126*** 0.133*** 0.134*** 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.046) (0.046) (0.036) (0.036) 
Business & admin 
studies 
0.211*** 0.225*** 0.199*** 0.197*** 0.204*** 0.207*** 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.037) (0.037) (0.029) (0.029) 
Mass communications 
& documentation 
-0.057 -0.045 0.054 0.044 0.004 0.002 
(0.065) (0.065) (0.049) (0.048) (0.039) (0.039) 
Historical & 
philosophical studies 
-0.039 -0.040 0.022 0.023 -0.009 -0.014 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.044) (0.044) (0.034) (0.034) 
Creative arts & design -0.015 -0.005 -0.114*** -0.105*** -0.065** -0.056* 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.041) (0.041) (0.033) (0.032) 
Education 0.141*** 0.149*** 0.136*** 0.081** 0.142*** 0.111*** 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.036) (0.037) (0.030) (0.031) 
Combined 0.135*** 0.156*** 0.081** 0.106*** 0.102*** 0.123*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.035) (0.035) (0.028) (0.028) 
Good Degree (I/2I)  0.113***  0.083***  0.096*** 
  (0.013)  (0.017)  (0.011) 
PG indicator  0.019  0.130***  0.077*** 
  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.013) 
Constant 2.202*** 2.051*** 2.091*** 2.124*** 2.397*** 2.349*** 
 (0.265) (0.267) (0.308) (0.307) (0.209) (0.208) 
Observations 4938 4938 5664 5664 10602 10602 
R2 0.362 0.372 0.178 0.188 0.290 0.298 
Note: RSE in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Merged LFS/HESA graduate sample (see sample 
notes for details). Institutional fixed effects not reported. Omitted category: New universities; Lower 2nd Class; 
Languages. 
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Table A2: Robustness to the exclusion of imputed A-Levels, Pooled Men and Women 
 Sample with actual A-Level scores 
only 
Sample with imputed A-
Level scores only 
 HEI FE & 
No A-Level 
HEI Type & Mean 
A-Level  
HEI FE & 
No A-Level 
HEI Type & 
Mean A-Level  
Age of respondent 0.193*** 0.209*** 0.190*** 0.185*** 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.014) (0.013) 
Age squared -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Non-white -0.043* -0.046** -0.061*** -0.062*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) 
Born in 1970s   -0.022 -0.019 
   (0.017) (0.016) 
Year 2013 = 1 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) 
Year 2014 = 1 0.069*** 0.066*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) 
Year 2015 = 1 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) 
London  0.257*** 0.259*** 0.313*** 0.305*** 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) 
Southeast 0.081*** 0.093*** 0.095*** 0.087*** 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) 
Wales  -0.007 -0.027 -0.029 -0.033 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.028) (0.025) 
Scotland  0.033 0.055 0.035 -0.004 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.047) (0.048) 
Northern Ireland -0.070 -0.122** -0.153*** -0.145*** 
 (0.096) (0.055) (0.045) (0.022) 
Detrended Standardized 
A-Level mean score 
  
0.063*** 
  
0.102*** 
  (0.013)  (0.010) 
Female -0.074*** -0.078*** -0.135*** -0.135*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) 
Old university  0.057***  0.011 
  (0.018)  (0.013) 
RG university  0.070***  0.068*** 
  (0.018)  (0.013) 
Constant -0.941 -1.159* -0.959*** -0.809*** 
 (0.628) (0.614) (0.211) (0.208) 
HEI fixed effect Yes No Yes No 
Observations 3087 3087 7515 7515 
R2 0.357 0.327 0.270 0.262 
Note: Robust SE in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Columns (1) and (3) control for HEI fixed-
effects, while columns (2) and (4) present parsimonious specification with HEI types dummies and selectivity 
measures only.
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Table A3: Full set of IWPRA estimates of Table 8, Men 
Outcome (wage) 
equations 
New-STEM New-SocSc New-Arts Old-STEM Old-SocSc Old-Arts RG-STEM RG-SocSc RG-Arts 
Age of respondent 0.213*** 0.011 0.266*** 0.103* 0.248*** 0.128* -0.012 0.404*** 0.130* 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.051) (0.057) (0.087) (0.076) (0.056) (0.071) (0.069) 
Age squared -0.003** 0.001 -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003** -0.001 0.001 -0.006*** -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-white -0.305*** -0.186*** -0.168* 0.165*** -0.038 -0.154 0.082* 0.125 0.021 
 (0.081) (0.055) (0.096) (0.060) (0.108) (0.149) (0.047) (0.087) (0.078) 
Born in 1970s 0.041 -0.182** 0.202** -0.149* -0.020 -0.052 0.099 0.203** 0.143 
 (0.101) (0.076) (0.096) (0.083) (0.143) (0.114) (0.100) (0.101) (0.115) 
Year=2013 0.113* 0.058 0.047 0.009 0.014 0.046 0.036 0.117 0.163** 
 (0.060) (0.048) (0.076) (0.045) (0.088) (0.076) (0.060) (0.099) (0.073) 
Year=2014 0.188** 0.144*** 0.079 -0.041 -0.065 0.015 0.060 0.220*** 0.118* 
 (0.078) (0.049) (0.071) (0.060) (0.098) (0.075) (0.075) (0.065) (0.068) 
Year=2015 0.098 0.081 0.206** 0.036 0.075 0.040 -0.001 0.279*** -0.007 
 (0.082) (0.056) (0.086) (0.060) (0.104) (0.095) (0.092) (0.070) (0.079) 
 London 0.239*** 0.544*** 0.426*** 0.274*** 0.342*** 0.351*** 0.312*** 0.256*** 0.456*** 
 (0.070) (0.049) (0.055) (0.065) (0.061) (0.059) (0.061) (0.068) (0.060) 
SE 0.058 0.291*** 0.055 0.047 0.198*** 0.101 0.036 0.191* 0.274*** 
 (0.045) (0.065) (0.069) (0.054) (0.061) (0.085) (0.068) (0.110) (0.104) 
Wales -0.120 0.141* 0.289*** -0.134 -0.144** 0.115 -0.088 0.119 -0.100* 
 (0.137) (0.072) (0.067) (0.086) (0.071) (0.101) (0.076) (0.084) (0.052) 
Scotland 0.167 0.432*** 0.088 0.219 0.017 -0.188* 0.114 0.047 -0.076 
 (0.156) (0.076) (0.129) (0.154) (0.248) (0.102) (0.116) (0.406) (0.157) 
Northern Ireland - - - - - - - - - 
Selectivity  -0.086* -0.002 0.243*** -0.016 0.044 -0.016 0.071** -0.016 -0.076* 
(0.047) (0.023) (0.052) (0.033) (0.063) (0.052) (0.033) (0.063) (0.045) 
Good Degree (I/2I) 0.168*** 0.100*** 0.110** 0.173*** 0.140** 0.056 -0.006 0.095 0.047 
 (0.050) (0.038) (0.053) (0.041) (0.063) (0.057) (0.066) (0.061) (0.063) 
PG indicator -0.049 -0.096* 0.004 0.032 0.061 0.087 0.156*** 0.219*** 0.017 
 (0.041) (0.058) (0.064) (0.054) (0.067) (0.059) (0.060) (0.053) (0.061) 
Constant -1.577* 1.089 -2.030*** 0.266 -1.877 -0.137 2.344*** -4.136*** -0.035 
 (0.923) (0.933) (0.763) (0.878) (1.223) (1.134) (0.874) (1.060) (1.014) 
{ PAGE   \* MERGEFORMAT } 
 
Treatment equations New-STEM New-SocSc New-Arts Old-STEM Old-SocSc Old-Arts RG-STEM RG-SocSc RG-Arts 
          
Age of respondent  0.203 -0.164 -0.123 0.076 -0.202 0.219 0.178 0.064 
  (0.156) (0.179) (0.170) (0.195) (0.216) (0.179) (0.205) (0.223) 
Age squared  -0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Non-white  0.545*** -0.294 -0.043 -0.292 -0.691* -0.225 -0.106 -1.882*** 
  (0.185) (0.258) (0.257) (0.290) (0.357) (0.255) (0.271) (0.545) 
Born in 1970s  0.575*** 0.135 0.272 0.360 0.139 0.616** 0.256 1.155*** 
  (0.222) (0.269) (0.259) (0.293) (0.332) (0.259) (0.299) (0.329) 
Year=2013  0.021 0.023 -0.101 -0.169 -0.244 -0.153 -0.103 0.096 
  (0.153) (0.186) (0.181) (0.205) (0.235) (0.174) (0.196) (0.230) 
Year=2014  -0.238 0.023 0.046 -0.028 -0.174 -0.215 -0.407** 0.253 
  (0.160) (0.187) (0.180) (0.200) (0.224) (0.179) (0.204) (0.228) 
Year=2015  -0.121 -0.136 -0.044 -0.615** 0.063 0.044 -0.264 0.127 
  (0.185) (0.228) (0.218) (0.276) (0.256) (0.204) (0.244) (0.282) 
 London  0.261 0.618*** 0.336* 1.205*** 1.203*** 0.408** 1.236*** 1.079*** 
  (0.160) (0.179) (0.182) (0.190) (0.200) (0.171) (0.181) (0.196) 
SE  0.054 0.248 0.538*** 0.655*** 0.206 0.318* 0.329 0.218 
  (0.157) (0.179) (0.167) (0.198) (0.239) (0.164) (0.203) (0.223) 
Wales  0.728* -1.468 1.764*** 2.049*** 2.004*** 1.299*** 1.328*** 0.654 
  (0.388) (1.032) (0.389) (0.398) (0.425) (0.392) (0.468) (0.599) 
Scotland  0.586 0.659 0.231 1.360** 1.257** 0.525 0.160 1.011* 
  (0.558) (0.638) (0.619) (0.578) (0.592) (0.546) (0.716) (0.562) 
Northern Ireland 
 
 - - - - - - - - 
Selectivity   0.192 0.302* 3.491*** 3.158*** 3.007*** 5.296*** 4.794*** 4.722*** 
 (0.166) (0.177) (0.196) (0.202) (0.202) (0.197) (0.203) (0.208) 
Constant   -2.654 2.368 2.208 -0.979 2.725 -2.894 -2.481 -0.176 
  (2.340) (2.671) (2.549) (2.923) (3.233) (2.668) (3.024) (3.293) 
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Table A4: Full set of IWPRA estimates of Table 8, Women 
Outcome (wage) 
equations 
New-STEM New-SocSc New-Arts Old-STEM Old-SocSc Old-Arts RG-STEM RG-SocSc RG-Arts 
Age of respondent 0.215*** 0.249*** 0.125** 0.241*** 0.060 0.231*** 0.249*** 0.132 0.185*** 
 (0.050) (0.046) (0.051) (0.058) (0.053) (0.058) (0.088) (0.084) (0.060) 
Age squared -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.000 -0.003*** -0.004** -0.001 -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-white -0.013 -0.061 -0.025 -0.025 -0.030 0.163** -0.102 -0.305** 0.145 
 (0.072) (0.126) (0.072) (0.082) (0.085) (0.076) (0.095) (0.128) (0.139) 
Born in 1970s -0.067 0.152* 0.101 -0.006 0.003 0.203** 0.148 -0.127 -0.084 
 (0.080) (0.087) (0.077) (0.104) (0.110) (0.087) (0.151) (0.106) (0.114) 
Year=2013 0.052 -0.035 0.034 0.097 -0.009 0.167*** -0.110 0.220** -0.010 
 (0.074) (0.058) (0.055) (0.069) (0.064) (0.055) (0.093) (0.089) (0.079) 
Year=2014 0.115 -0.053 0.011 0.171** 0.161*** 0.211*** -0.180** 0.170** 0.097 
 (0.074) (0.086) (0.051) (0.073) (0.059) (0.058) (0.076) (0.082) (0.062) 
Year=2015 -0.005 0.032 0.193*** 0.049 0.052 0.279*** -0.045 0.225* 0.127 
 (0.072) (0.062) (0.065) (0.088) (0.074) (0.078) (0.106) (0.119) (0.093) 
 London 0.223*** 0.234*** 0.350*** 0.272*** 0.240*** 0.216*** 0.206*** 0.429*** 0.382*** 
 (0.058) (0.073) (0.055) (0.065) (0.064) (0.070) (0.070) (0.059) (0.070) 
SE -0.012 0.140** 0.143*** 0.077 0.070 0.128** -0.087 0.142 0.130** 
 (0.087) (0.058) (0.055) (0.072) (0.060) (0.055) (0.129) (0.095) (0.054) 
Wales -0.273 0.134*** 0.022 0.070 0.032 0.110 -0.021 0.133 0.107 
 (0.197) (0.046) (0.126) (0.078) (0.071) (0.080) (0.097) (0.130) (0.133) 
Scotland 0.202 0.267 -0.030 -0.160 0.199 -0.393 -0.004 -0.027 0.073 
 (0.221) (0.340) (0.072) (0.227) (0.182) (0.243) (0.123) (0.080) (0.122) 
Northern Ireland -0.534*** -0.028 0.063 -0.202* -0.047 -0.169* -0.183** -0.148 -0.070 
 (0.062) (0.168) (0.126) (0.116) (0.089) (0.087) (0.080) (0.126) (0.138) 
Selectivity 0.302*** 0.016 0.278*** 0.003 0.122*** 0.033 0.100 0.147*** 0.038 
(0.038) (0.022) (0.041) (0.043) (0.039) (0.045) (0.071) (0.032) (0.045) 
Good Degree (I/2I) 0.177*** 0.080** 0.082** 0.030 0.233*** 0.134*** -0.007 -0.013 0.328*** 
 (0.051) (0.034) (0.040) (0.060) (0.053) (0.052) (0.109) (0.070) (0.086) 
PG indicator 0.215*** 0.147*** 0.108* 0.170*** 0.203*** 0.108** 0.027 0.033 0.047 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.062) (0.054) (0.055) (0.048) (0.082) (0.056) (0.058) 
Constant -1.400* -1.822*** -0.187 -1.745** 0.777 -1.753** -1.202 -0.267 -1.310 
 (0.732) (0.686) (0.704) (0.850) (0.758) (0.807) (1.217) (1.233) (0.852) 
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Treatment equations New-STEM New-SocSc New-Arts Old-STEM Old-SocSc Old-Arts RG-STEM RG-SocSc RG-Arts 
          
Age of respondent  0.102 0.106 -0.086 0.022 0.281 0.461** 0.132 0.024 
  (0.161) (0.180) (0.209) (0.194) (0.216) (0.192) (0.197) (0.191) 
Age squared  -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.008** -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Non-white  0.326 -0.578** 0.170 0.048 -0.557* -0.443* -0.325 -1.317*** 
  (0.199) (0.259) (0.267) (0.247) (0.311) (0.261) (0.266) (0.325) 
Born in 1970s  0.246 0.618** 0.277 0.362 0.438 0.181 0.145 0.319 
  (0.244) (0.278) (0.334) (0.303) (0.327) (0.301) (0.312) (0.313) 
Year=2013  -0.216 -0.042 -0.169 -0.451** -0.086 -0.175 -0.104 -0.209 
  (0.174) (0.188) (0.219) (0.210) (0.223) (0.202) (0.218) (0.211) 
Year=2014  -0.317* -0.236 -0.401* -0.642*** -0.223 -0.515** -0.188 -0.354* 
  (0.175) (0.192) (0.217) (0.211) (0.224) (0.204) (0.216) (0.210) 
Year=2015  0.045 -0.187 -0.353 -0.293 -0.352 -0.319 -0.079 -0.174 
  (0.205) (0.231) (0.269) (0.248) (0.280) (0.241) (0.259) (0.249) 
 London  0.191 0.621*** 0.411* 0.710*** 0.656*** 0.445** 0.877*** 1.068*** 
  (0.185) (0.198) (0.240) (0.216) (0.230) (0.207) (0.211) (0.204) 
SE  0.140 0.018 0.862*** 0.765*** 0.842*** 0.409** 0.370* 0.430** 
  (0.169) (0.191) (0.202) (0.201) (0.209) (0.196) (0.215) (0.203) 
Wales  1.023 1.699** 3.408*** 3.324*** 3.263*** 2.501*** 2.693*** 2.102*** 
  (0.785) (0.778) (0.768) (0.764) (0.775) (0.779) (0.787) (0.808) 
Scotland  -1.572*** -1.429** 0.051 0.150 -0.113 -0.804 -0.979 -0.114 
  (0.577) (0.660) (0.554) (0.488) (0.557) (0.563) (0.761) (0.587) 
Northern   1.437 0.970 3.722*** 4.421*** 4.058*** 3.804*** 4.579*** 3.820*** 
Ireland  (1.068) (1.162) (1.078) (1.048) (1.055) (1.079) (1.066) (1.086) 
Selectivity   -0.346** -0.259 3.335*** 2.769*** 2.502*** 4.865*** 4.489*** 4.150*** 
 (0.159) (0.161) (0.207) (0.193) (0.184) (0.194) (0.203) (0.191) 
Constant   -0.945 -0.513 1.393 0.359 -4.208 -6.499** -2.254 0.129 
  (2.377) (2.630) (3.041) (2.824) (3.193) (2.811) (2.903) (2.812) 
 
 
